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Abstract 
The risk assessment proposed in this paper is a method based on the calculation of three kind of indicators based on the probability 
of threat incidents and assessing the subsequent consequences of these ones. The consequences are measured by the upset to the 
service; its scope, which for the distribution service is normally quantified by the number of properties affected; and by the duration 
of the upset, which is directly related to the concept of system resilience or response capacity. The method to characterise a 
distribution system by means of risk principles aims to support better decisions, accounting for different risk assessment scopes for 
the purpose depending on the type of decision to be made and the time horizons involved. 
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1. Introduction 
The water supply and distribution service provided by a system is normally measured by its upsets to the service 
within a particular time interval and by the degree of non-compliance with the reference parameters or standards in 
place for the service. In addition to what really happened, all systems are subject to a certain risk of failing to comply 
with the supply standards or of suffering upsets to the service as a result of unavoidable dysfunctions, anomalies and 
deviations that may occur. 
The consideration of this risk and its different components and assessments constitute the main parameter within 
which to characterise a system and its operation, thus, it is a key factor in supply and distribution system operation and 
planning decision making. The method put forward in this paper aims to help the making of better decisions, laying 
down the most suitable bases to this end: the knowledge of existing and forecasted risks. Water distribution systems 
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will soon be assessed not only on the basis of the services provided, but also on the risk of non-compliance of certain 
standards within the short, medium and long term.  
At present, distribution system risk assessment is not a general practice. There are several reasons for this, the main 
one is probably the lack of a generally accepted method for its calculation, which is due to the particular problems 
involved in distribution networks as regards the difficulty of being able to count on reliable information on its real 
operating system and to possess a solid knowledge base on which to determine the probability of incidents occurring 
that represent a threat and which are the causes of service upsets.  
Fortunately, the sectorisation of distribution networks that is being implemented on a lot of distribution systems 
makes possible, among other advantages, to more reliably assess service risks, as well as to more efficiently reduce 
them. This can be achieved by the sectors configuration and design, or by means of a useful monitoring of how the 
distribution works and the laying down of efficient operating procedures to tackle incidents. Sectorisation, therefore, 
opens the door to separate risk assessments for every sector or individual property in a particular distribution system. 
This individual assessment contributes to the overall risk assessment for the system. 
This paper describes a methodological approach to assess this type of risks in a sectorized system, in order to make 
planning and operating decisions and their application to the Canal de Isabel II Gestión S. A. distribution system in 
the Autonomous Community of Madrid (Spain). This system has over 18,000 km of piping grouped into over 800 
sectors. 
2. Methodological considerations 
2.1. Three risk assessment scopes 
The characterisation of a distribution system using risk assessment principles can be accomplished with different 
approaches, depending on the decisions to be made and the time limits involved. 
(1) Risk linked to structural elements. It assesses the non-fulfilment of service risk related to the breakage (or some 
other structural dysfunction) of each system element individually. This assessment is used to make of decisions, such 
as those related to short and medium-term renewal investments. It takes the element’s inherent characteristics into 
account (diameter, material, age) and others factors concerning its operational context to assign a service upset 
probability to each one as a result of dysfunction and its repair. This probability is based on a statistical analysis of 
the upsets records occurred in the past and in the use of useful service life models for each element. Additionally the 
global impact of the failure on each element is also assessed.  
(2) Risk at consumption points. It assesses the risk of the non-availability of suitable service conditions at each 
property or group of properties and sectors. It analyses different risk types (discontinuity, pressure, water quality) at 
each service connection for structural and operational configuration and, moreover, provides information on the 
implications of any change to system operation. Having the entire network sectors characterised by parameters that 
measure the risk at the sector heads helps to make decisions both in the short term, as well as in more extended 
timeframes. The risk assessment in this case takes into account topological features and the sector’s internal operation, 
studying and assessing their links to other strategic network elements (tanks, treatment stations, abstractions, pumping, 
and sector inlet pipes). It also assesses the impact related to the sector’s internal configuration and size. 
(3) Overall system risk. It represents the sum of the risks of all elements and service connections. It affords an 
overall view of the status of the network in terms of risk, thus enabling the making of strategic decisions in the medium 
and long term. It is an innovative application of a supply system’s overall risk that makes possible to compare different 
action alternatives on a system by using homogeneous parameters from different types of service risk. It would serve 
as an indicator to be used as a service reference or standard for a distribution system. 
The risk calculation methods, for the three proposed scopes, are based on the following formula: 
 
Risk = Probability of threat incident x Impact of service upset     (1) 
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2.2. Threat incidents 
Generally speaking, for all risk assessment scopes, those incidents that may represent a threat to the service and 
the occurrence probability of which can be calculated are: 
x Pipe or structural element breakage 
x Pumping breakage or failure 
x Demands beyond expected ranges  
x Manoeuvres that fall outside expected operating scenarios and which affect service quality variables: residence 
times and pressures or concentration parameters (water quality) 
x Anomaly at the treatment station affecting the output parameters 
x Anomaly as regards water availability or characteristics at abstraction. 
In all cases, the probability of the threat incident is determined by a statistical study of past records or the use of 
service life and failure probability calculation models that combine different explanatory variables. 
2.3. Upsets 
The next step is to define the potential upsets to the service as a result of the stated threat incidents. The basic 
service quality parameters used to classify a service as inadequate are as follows: (1) Supply discontinuity; (2) 
Insufficient or excessive pressure; (3) High water residence time in the network or insufficient concentration of some 
parameter causing water quality deficiency. 
All pressure and residence time or concentration values are assessed by way of deviation with respect to reference 
thresholds established as standards. 
The following must be taken into account to measure the impact or effects of upsets: (1) Number of properties 
affected; (2) Duration of the upset. 
In turn, the duration of the upset is closely linked to system reaction capacity or resilience. This depends on the 
existing infrastructures, resources and operating practices applied for preventative and corrective maintenance. Times 
are measured by: (1) Problem awareness and localisation; (2) Repair; (3) Operation for alternative supplies; (4) 
Operation to mitigate effects. 
2.4. Assessment scenarios 
The starting point in all risk assessment scenarios, no matter the scope, is the characterising of the system on the 
basis of certain factors, which will be steady in some cases and dynamic in some others within known or expected 
ranges. The characteristics that define a distribution system can be grouped into seven categories: 
(1) Structural characteristics or inherent attributes of the elements that constitute the system (dimensions, diameters, 
materials, capacities, etc.); 
(2) Operating capacity of system infrastructures and equipment; 
(3) Network topology and its segregation into sectors; 
(4) Operating features of pumps, valves and treatment stations (input parameters to hydraulic models), linked to 
system operating strategy rules; 
(5) Network element and infrastructure operating patterns (pumping, tanks and regulating valves) linked to 
expected system demand; 
(6) Current and forecasted demands for the short term; 
(7) Resilience capacity to cope with different types of anomaly. 
Categories (1), (2) and (3) can be taken as known and steady for scenarios in the short term, as they define the 
system. Category (7), concerning resilience capacity, is also taken as steady because it depends on system 
configuration in terms of infrastructures and the set of resources and capacities to recover the service. It is normally 
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only altered when analysing strategic change hypotheses, when implementing new technologies or for corrective 
maintenance policies. 
The remaining categories cover dynamic characteristics that adopt changing values within a risk assessment 
scenario. Some of them behave in a expected or cyclic way – categories (5) and (6) linked to water demands –, and 
some others like category (4) are operationally variable and depend on operation planning and programming decisions. 
The values of the latter are known and marked out beforehand, as they are concerned with different operating rules 
for the strategic infrastructures.  
It could be argued that all the variables covered by each of these seven categories can also differ from their given 
values with a certain probability, because nothing is really unchanging. Nonetheless, in the method put forward only 
deviations related to the aforementioned threat incidents are admitted and considered as a basis for calculation, given 
they are the only ones for which deviation probability can be calculated with any degree of liability. 
The starting point for this risk assessment is established by using hydraulic models simulating system operation. 
Probable values that can be adopted by non-static system variables – categories (4), (5) and (6) – are the models’ input 
parameters. Hydraulic models’ output provides status variable values for all system elements and nodes (speed, flow, 
pressure, tank storage, water residence time or concentration of some water quality parameter). This may be a single 
value for each variable or a range of values if the simulation hypothesis covers foreseeable demand variations in the 
daily cycle or in the time interval under study. Moreover, there are several possible system operation alternatives. This 
is how the baseline data for the system (values for the characteristic system variables or status variables) is obtained 
before the study of occurrence of the threat incident and the risk assessment. 
A tree graph is then drawn up showing the topological links of the water path and the hydraulic models’ output 
data are transferred to it. The operating variables at system nodes are analysed, comparing the initial scenario values 
to thresholds and possible variation ranges that have been set to ensure service quality. Accordingly, reference ranges 
are set at each sector head for the calculated pressure to ensure minimum and maximum service pressure at the critical 
sector point, or to ensure minimum and maximum pressures at a service connection that is representative of the sector 
in question as a whole. Even though in reality a curve can be made at each head sector that relates the minimum 
pressure at the head with the number of properties that are left in the sector without sufficient pressure. 
After the initial scenario has been defined, the next step is to calculate the probability of the threat incident and its 
link to each element to be able to draw up a tree graph that reflects the new system operating conditions in the new 
assessment scenario. The hydraulic models are calculated again and the deviations of the service quality variables are 
analysed at each node. 
3. Risk evaluation 
3.1. Assessing the risk in elements 
Each system element is linked to an individual failure probability which depends on the type, inherent 
characteristics, conditions and status of each one. 
x Pipes and related elements. The failure probability is assessed by a remaining useful life parameter in which the 
age, material, diameter, incident records, inspection records, operating pressure system, ground conditions, etc. 
are taken into account. 
x Pumps. The failure probability is assessed in accordance with the useful remaining life, the operating system with 
respect to rated capacity and the incident records and findings during inspections. 
x Tanks. The failure probability is linked to its structural condition and the configuration of each tank that enable 
compartments isolation or not in case of problem. The degree of filling in the course of the daily cycle is also 
assessed with respect to the reference volume to guarantee supply. This reference volume is determined as the 
sum of the volume that will be consumed at a future time interval equal to the repair time for the element with the 
greater resolution time for pipes and elements that are located upstream, plus the safety margin volume. As far as 
service upsets are concerned that are caused by inadequate water quality, the probability of water quality 
deterioration inside the tank is related to the residence time there, the maintenance and cleaning policies, the 
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amount of time since the last cleaning and the possible stratification and stagnation of the water. The residence 
time in each tank represents a contribution to the total up to consumption. 
Furthermore, the impact of the upsets on the service caused by the hypothetical dysfunction is calculated for each 
element, multiplying the number of properties affected for the resilience or recovery ability, measured in affected 
time. On pipes, resilience depends on the diameter, the position and installation conditions. On pumps, resilience 
depends on the back-up groups and the supply alternatives when they are out of service. Lastly, on tanks, a structural 
failure can be resolved by special use of compartments, or simply bypassing the tank, with the subsequent effect on 
the risk of discontinuity. 
All systems elements have an attribute that quantifies the failure risk for that element as a result of the risk 
assessment conducted according to this scope. 
3.2. Assessing risk in consumption nodes and sectors 
The sector head risk is calculated on the basis of drawing up a tree graph that represents the strategic transport 
network infrastructures to each sector’s inlet (or inlets) and the water flow topological links; i.e. the path followed by 
water from sources to its treatment up to the inlet points to each sector for each one of the demand hypotheses and 
possible system operation rules. Accordingly, for each assessment hypothesis, each graph element is related to a 
probability of individual and accumulated failure in the path of the water up to the element in question. In turn, the 
recovery capacity or resilience for each element is assessed in the event of failure. 
By following this method and using a tool to transfer the output values from the hydraulic models to the tree graph, 
it becomes possible to assess what the accumulated failure probability is at the sector head for each one of the service 
parameters (continuity, pressure and water quality), observing what the topological links with the sector’s upstream 
strategic network are and establishing possible supply alternatives for the sector in question. 
It is important to underline the fact that when calculating the accumulated failure probability in supply 
discontinuity, in the analysis of the sequence of elements located upstream of the point under study, the tank elements 
play the role of buffers capable of neutralising or alleviating accumulated probabilities arising from the elements 
located upstream of the same. Though it must also be remembered that, in the event of this buffer not sufficing, the 
failure leads to a discontinuity the recovery from which on the whole downstream system from the tank will last 
proportionately to the length of all the pipes and elements that may be drained as a result of draining the tank. 
The impact, which is the other factor in risk equation, is assessed at the sector head by the number of properties 
affected and the sector resilience. This will depend on whether it has only a single inlet (which is the one assessed) or 
if it has another permanent, simultaneously operating one, or an identified alternative, or even other network 
connection possibilities that have not been formally identified. 
Having characterised the inlets to each sector with the probability of failure or supply upsets, along with the 
associated impact, homogenous parameters are available to compare sectors and identify the more vulnerable areas in 
the distribution system. 
Next step is to assess the risk at service connections. Likewise a tree graph is drawn up for each sector that links 
each one of the service connections on the distribution network through which the water circulates from the sector 
head (or heads) to the supply point. The hydraulic model output values are then transferred to the graph. Accordingly, 
all the individual nodes of each service connection and their properties are assigned sector head inadequate service 
probabilities (continuity, pressure and water quality), which are increased by those corresponding to the piping that 
leads from the head to the service connection point. 
Resilience will depend on the available isolation scope (shut-off polygon) and the capacity to recover in a 
determined space of time (which will vary according to the type and characteristics of the problem element). 
In short, the risk linked to the failure or dysfunction of each one of the distribution system elements, which can be 
assessed for each element, must be distinguished from the risk at each network node, which depends on the failure 
probability for all upstream elements and on quantified consequences for all consumption points (properties) located 
downstream of the node along with the resilience determined by the network's configuration. 
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3.3. Assessing overall system risk 
After risk parameters are known at all supply nodes (probability of service upset, affected properties and duration) 
an overall view is now available for the distribution system risk. This risk can be assessed on the basis of parameters 
such as resilience, measured as maximum upset time interval at a particular number of properties at the same time, 
along with the probability of this being exceeded in an annual cycle, as shown as an example on figure 1. Accordingly, 
the system can be characterised with values of the following type: 
x Probability that no individual property is without supply for more than 18 hours (something equivalent also 
referring to maximum and minimum service pressure and the residence time or concentration of water quality 
parameters). 
x Probability that no group of over 5,000 properties are without supply in excess of 16 hours, and similar for pressure 
and water quality. 
x Probability that no group of over 50,000 properties will suffer service upsets in excess of 12 hours. 
Moreover, if acceptable risk target standards are laid down for the system, a comparison pattern then becomes 
available to make decisions. Different operating hypotheses or actions on system configuration (assessment scenarios) 
can now be studied along with the repercussions they have in terms of risk. It becomes possible to assess if the overall 
system risk, after the action under study, approaches or strays from the maximum values set as an accepted target. 
As far defining overall risk target standards are concerned, the only value that would be accepted for the entire 




Fig. 1. Overall risk assessment. 
4. Applications for decision making 
Two application levels are proposed: (1) Structural, for planning investments, which may be short-term such as for 
renewal, or medium to long-term ones for building new structures and for strategic medium and long-term policies; 
(2) Operational, to identify more efficient local and strategic operating rules in the short term, and to resolve incidents 
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on the spot in which the risk involved in the problem situation is assessed, along with the different operational options 
with their subsequent induced risks. 
A particular structural level risk application is that of planning and prioritising network renewal actions. The 
implications on the risk of each action are studied in any renewal plan, in addition to taking other variables into account 
such as the economic, social and environmental costs. Social impacts can be added to the service upset assessment, 
considering which ones can cause alterations to urban activity (such as closing down traffic lanes on city roads). Each 
structural element has to be linked to its location on the urban stretch when conducting this assessment and there must 
be stretch qualification parameters available (such as, for example, the number of lanes). 
The probability of the following threat incidents occurring is assessed in an operational analysis: (1) Deviation 
from expected demands with respect to the range of possible values at each strategic consumption node; (2) Operation 
or manoeuvre that causes a deviation with respect to the range of possible pressures; (3) Operation or demand that 
causes a deviation with respect to the possible tank storage ranges, the values of which are known and market out for 
the different system common operating rules; (4) Breakages or failures of structural elements or resources' availability. 
Generally speaking, to make decisions at an operational level, for each sector or group of network elements any 
assessment must be made of the alternatives to its lack of operating capacity. Both with respect to the most probable 
strategic operating scheme analysed, as well as by means of other strategic operating approaches. This assessment of 
the alternatives must be extended to cover the most important nodes: supply sectors or special nodes. All system tanks, 
the majority of local tanks that can be bypassed, and pumps that have an alternative to their operation, fall into this 
category of special nodes. 
When a problem has already occurred, the operational level risk assessment follows similar procedures to those for 
normal operating conditions, though the conditioning factors involved in making urgent decisions require diagnostic 
accuracy and analysis simplification that merit a detailed description that lies beyond the scope of this document. 
5. Risk assessment example 
The results are given below of the study conducted to identify, on days of maximum consumption, the areas with 
some types of risk, both with respect to supply continuity and non-compliance with service levels. In terms of water 
pressure and quality that Canal de Isabel II Gestión aspires to provide for all of its customers. This risk assessment is 
carried out supposing the proper working of all the infrastructures, considering as threat incidents the occurrence of 
maximum daily demand with high values, to which a probability is assigned, or those ones linked to structural 
insufficiencies or supply and distribution system element operating behaviour.  
The measurement of the upset scope is based on the number of sectors and properties that are affected by: (1) Sector 
head pressure lower than that which ensure that all connection points have a pressure of over 25 mH2O; (2) Water 
residence time of over 96 hours in the network, after its treatment; (3) Discontinuity owing to draining of a local tank. 
The risk of tank draining has been assessed in turn for its capacity to maintain the stored volume after serving a 24-
hour consumption cycle and for approaching, in the daily cycle, stored volumes that suffice to serve less than 2 hours 
of its demand. 
  Table 1. Scope of service upsets for three risk assessment scenarios  
 Operation A Operation B Operation C 












Continuity (Tank min.vol.<2hrs consum.) 7 17,201 5 14,615 4 14,346 
Continuity (Non-recovery in 24-h cycle) 6 3,079 5 2,681 2 517 
Low pressure 7 58,095 5 24,285 0 0 
Water quality problems 17 14,419 1 386 1 386 
Total 37 92,794 16 41,581 7 15,246 
The calculation is based on strategic network modelling, characterising distribution sectors' requirements at their 
inlets and hourly quantifying of the distribution demand to different sectors for a supposed maximum daily demand 
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occurring on high temperature working days before the holiday exodus. The maximum daily demand considered has 
a determined occurrence probability, the calculation of which makes it feasible to use the risk formula (1) indicated 
in the risk assessment method section above. 
The sample refers to system operating settings at the first risk assessment scenario (Operation A), which are later 
modified in subsequent scenarios (Operation B and Operation C) to mitigate or reduce the scope of the service upsets. 
The results are given in Table 1. 
6. Conclusions 
Having a distribution system characterised according to the risk that the service provided is inadequate is a basic 
decision-making aid at different levels and different time scales. Assessing system risk for different scopes: overall, 
customers level and by elements, provides extremely valuable information for strategic management infrastructure. 
The risk assessment method proposed goes further than assessing the probability of pipe breakages on the system 
and analysing their consequences. It takes into account service quality upset probability from a three scope 
perspective: element, sector/service connection and overall system. This methodology is possible through the 
sectorisation of the network, which establishes a particular system configuration and enables the use of hydraulic 
models and tree graphs with network topology. Sectorisation also enables the impact assessment of service upsets, 
both with respect to the number of properties affected, as well as the duration of these ones, which is closely linked to 
system resilience. 
This method allows for a homogeneous assessment of alternatives by means of calculating a system's risk 
parameters for different scenarios and time scales. It helps to compare possible action options on the system, affording 
an insight into the effect each one has on risk rates. 
This document presents the method used at Canal de Isabel II Gestión, which is in charge of the water supply for 
the Autonomous Community of Madrid (Spain), to avail of a tool to aid in strategic, planning and operation decision 
making based on risk criteria. It is an innovative vision and a long path for future improvement of strategic 
management infrastructure urban water distribution systems. 
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